Synthesis for Games of Imperfect Information under Full-Information Protocols
Monday 7 July 2025 at 14h00
ENS Paris-Saclay, Room 1B36
Abstract: Different models can be used to represent programs, to check their correctness, or even better to synthesise them from a specification. Here, we model a program as a player against an environment. Constructing a correct program then boils down to synthesising a winning strategy in the associated game, that is, a behaviour that ensures that the winning condition is satisfied regardless of the behaviour of the environment.
We introduce a new class of games where the player receives imperfect information by communicating with passive observers in a full-information protocol. Unlike the classical model, the player can in one moment obtain an unbounded amount of information.
The defense will be in English
Jury:
- Christel BAIER, Technische Universität Dresden, Rapportrice et examinatrice,
- Blaise GENEST, CNRS, National University of Singapore, Rapporteur et examinateur,
- Véronique BRUYÈRE, Université de Mons, Examinatrice,
- Jean GOUBAULT-LARRECQ, ENS Paris-Saclay Examinateur
- Nir PITERMAN, Chalmers University of Technology Gothenburg, Examinateur
- Laurent DOYEN, CNRS, Directeur
- Dietmar BERWANGER, CNRS, Co-encadrant.